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AlphaCo: A Teaching Case on Information 
Technology Audit and Security1 
 
                                                 
1 AlphaCo is a fictitious company. The purpose of this teaching case is to serve as a basis for 
classroom discussions rather than to illustrate effective or ineffective handling of IT audit and 
security issues. Hypothetical facts and scenarios are used to enrich classroom discussions. 
Resemblance to any real company is unintentional. The teaching case is prepared by Joshua 
Bertsch, Jonathan Harrison, Poling Hsiao, and Ketan Mesuria as part of their student team 
project in the IT Audit & Security Course at the Red McCombs Business School. The project 
was completed under the professional guidance of David Hendrawirawan and the academic 
supervision of Professor Hüseyin Tanriverdi. The project won the Best Student Project Award of 
the Austin Chapter of ISACA during the 2005 spring semester. 
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ABSTRACT 
Recent regulations in the United States (U.S.) such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
of 2002 require top management of a public firm to provide reasonable 
assurance that they institute internal controls that minimize risks over the 
firm’s operations and financial reporting. External auditors are required to 
attest to the management’s assertions over the effectiveness of those internal 
controls. As firms rely more on information technology (IT) in conducting 
business, they also become more vulnerable to IT related risks. IT is critical for 
initiating, recording, processing, summarizing and reporting accurate financial 
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and non-financial data. Thus, understanding IT related risks and instituting 
internal control mechanisms that minimize them have become important and 
created an urgent need for professionals who are equipped with IT audit and 
security skills and knowledge. However, there is severe shortage of teaching 
cases that can be used in courses aimed at training such professionals. This 
teaching case begins to address this gap by fostering classroom discussions 
around IT audit and security issues. It revolves around a hacking incident that 
compromised online order processing systems of AlphaCo and led to some 
fraudulent activity. The hacking incident raises a series of questions about IT 
security vulnerabilities, internal control deficiencies, integrity of financial 
statements, and independent auditors’ assessment of fraud in the context of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act. The case places students in the roles of executives, IT 
managers, and auditors and encourages them to discuss several important 
questions: how and why did the hacking incident happen; what harm did it 
cause to the firm; how can the firm prevent such hacking incidents in the 
future; if they do happen, how can the firm detect hacking incidents and fraud 
sooner; how do auditors assess the impact of such incidents in the context of a 
financial statement audit; and whether the management and auditors have 
responsibility in detecting and publicly reporting fraud? The case also 
facilitates the teaching of relevant conceptual frameworks such as COSO 
(Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission) and 
COBIT (Control Objectives for Information and related Technology). 
Keywords: Information technology, risk, internal control, security, hacking, 
audit, fraud, financial reporting, compliance, Sarbanes-Oxley Act, teaching 
case 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In early 2002, the accounts receivable department of AlphaCo discovered a 
significant amount of uncollected accounts while performing an aging analysis. 
These accounts totaled in the millions and were tracked to shipments to an 
Aegean Island. Several of the accounts were listed under the same address. 
Further reviews revealed that the accounts were fraudulent. A hacker 
penetrated the online order management system of the firm, created fake 
accounts and placed about 50 fraudulent orders over a period of three months 
and stole shipments that have a value of approximately $20 million. 
When they called the phone number listed in the fraudulent accounts, to their 
surprise, AlphaCo representatives were able to reach the hacker, who seemed 
to be waiting for the AlphaCo’s call. The hacker threatened that unless the firm 
paid him $10 million, he would publish IT security vulnerabilities of the firm 
and his hacking techniques on the Internet and harm AlphaCo's reputation. 
AlphaCo immediately contacted law enforcement agencies. In recent years, 
these kinds of hacking incidents and extortions were on the rise. Several 
international hackers compromised computers throughout the United States 
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and stole usernames, passwords, credit card information, and other financial 
data, and then extorted the victims with the threat of deleting their data and 
destroying their computer systems. Thus, the law enforcement agencies viewed 
this as a serious crime and a major threat to electronic commerce and the 
integrity of data that the financial community relies upon to do business 
nationally and internationally. 
With the knowledge of the law enforcement agencies, AlphaCo entered 
negotiations with the hacker. While the effort to catch the hacker was 
underway, AlphaCo brought in computer forensics experts and IT security 
consultants to investigate how exactly the online order management system 
had been breached. This information was crucial for fixing the IT security 
vulnerabilities that allowed the hacking incident and also for preparing 
electronic evidence to present to the courts to prosecute the hacker once he is 
caught. After their initial investigation, the computer forensics experts reported 
that it would be a very costly effort to find, capture, and preserve the electronic 
evidence left by the hacker and to prepare the evidence for the court case.  
The Chief Information Officer (CIO) called the Chief Executive Officer 
(CEO), Chief Financial Officer (CFO), and the Director of Internal Audit 
(DIA) into an urgent meeting. The CIO informed the top management that the 
firm’s business relies heavily on IT and that the breach of security in the online 
order management system can cause significant harm to the firm’s reputation 
and business. He urged the top management to increase the IT budget 
significantly so that they can undertake a full computer forensics investigation 
to identify and fix the IT security vulnerabilities of the firm. He also 
emphasized how important it is to use professional computer forensics 
expertise in capturing, preserving and preparing the electronic evidence to be 
able to prosecute the hacker in the court of law. 
Standing in stark opposition to the CIO’s request was the CFO, who wanted 
the IT department to adhere strictly to its original budget and solve any 
problems within the constraints of the budget. The CFO explained that the 
firm’s IT budget was already significantly above the industry average. The 
CEO sympathized with the CFO. He was worried that increasing the IT budget 
further could increase the cost of doing business significantly. The CEO and 
CFO were questioning whether further investments into IT security were really 
necessary.  
The Director of Internal Audit (DIA) touched on another important implication 
of the hacking incident. She explained that the section 302 of the newly 
introduced Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) Act of 2002 requires the CEO and CFO of a 
public company to certify quarterly and annually that they are responsible for 
disclosure controls, they have designed controls to ensure that material 
information is known to them, evaluated the effectiveness of controls, 
presented their conclusions in the filing, and disclosed to the audit committee 
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and auditors significant control deficiencies and acts of fraud. Further, section 
404 of SOX requires the CEO and CFO to annually state their responsibility 
for establishing and maintaining an adequate internal control structure and 
procedures for financial reporting, conduct and provide an assessment of the 
effectiveness of the enterprise’s internal controls. It also requires the external 
auditor to attest to the management’s assertion and the internal controls 
identified by the management. In the short-term, she was concerned that the 
fraudulent orders of the hacker could have an impact on the firm’s financial 
statement audit. In the long-term, she anticipated that these kinds of IT security 
breaches could inhibit the firm’s ability to comply with SOX. She informed the 
CEO and CFO that her department recently adopted the COSO2 and COBIT3 
frameworks, which are among the state of the art conceptual frameworks for 
thinking about internal controls around the firm’s business processes and the 
supporting IT systems. But she emphasized that her department will also need 
a significantly increased budget to implement the internal control best practices 
implied by those frameworks.  
The DIA’s explanations changed the course of the discussions. The CEO and 
CFO began asking questions about how SOX requirements and COSO and 
COBIT frameworks inform issues pertaining to the hacking incident. They 
were worried about the potential impact of this incident on the firm’s financial 
statement audit and the firm’s ability to comply with SOX. They also 
wondered whether the firm should disclose the hacking incident publicly.  
2. ALPHACO BACKGROUND 
AlphaCo Inc. is a global distributor of a diversified range of mechanical, 
electrical, and electronic systems and components such as semiconductors, 
liquid crystal displays, data communications equipment and supplies, 
electromechanical devices, mechanical and electrical power transmission 
products, bearings, conveyor components, electric motors, industrial computer 
products and subsystems, and so forth. In addition, it offers a complementary 
set of services to its suppliers and resellers such as financial services, logistics, 
sales, marketing, engineering, and customer support. AlphaCo operates in 150 
countries across Africa, Asia, Eurasia, Europe, Australia, North America and 
South America. It has 105 distribution centers worldwide and sales offices or 
representatives in 95 countries. The firm is headquartered in the U.S and 
                                                 
2 COSO stands for The Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission. 
This committee was formed in 1985 to study causal factors that can lead to fraudulent financial 
reporting and developed recommendations for public companies and their independent auditors, 
for the SEC and other regulators, and for educational institutions. The COSO framework is the 
result of those studies. 
3 COBIT stands for Control Objectives for Information and related Technology. It is an IT 
governance framework and supporting toolset that allows managers to bridge the gap between 
control requirements, technical issues and business risks. 
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publicly traded in the New York Stock Exchange. Since it has presence 
worldwide, it is subject to not only the U.S laws and regulations, but also the 
laws and regulations of the markets in which it operates. 
AlphaCo operates in a highly competitive environment worldwide. It does 
business with manufacturers, distributors, and resellers who sell directly to 
end-users. AlphaCo has a very diverse product line. It markets and distributes 
more than 500,000 products from over 5000 suppliers. Its global presence 
provides suppliers with access to a broad base of geographically dispersed 
resellers. The diverse product line enables the firm to serve as a one-stop shop 
for many customers. The ability to cross-sell multiple products to the same 
customer increases revenues of the firm. The global reach and diverse product 
line of the firm also minimize the firm’s exposure to economic downturns. 
Even when some product lines and markets experience downturns, the firm is 
able to smooth out its cash flows by relying on other product lines and markets 
in its portfolio. In 2002, net sales of the firm exceeded $42 billion (See 
Appendix 1). 
To provide quick order taking and fulfillment capabilities and consistent, 
timely and accurate delivery around the world, AlphaCo invested heavily in IT. 
The core IT infrastructure of the firm relies on mainframes. But it also includes 
a variety of IT hardware and operating system platforms that were inherited 
from mergers and acquisitions of the firm over the years. AlphaCo is one of the 
earliest adopters of enterprise resource planning (ERP) systems and e-business 
capabilities. Recently, it made several investments to better integrate its 
modern and legacy systems and build web-based interfaces to provide access to 
customers and business partners. AlphaCo employs about 1500 IT staff 
worldwide to support its IT infrastructure. The IT infrastructure processes more 
than 20 million business transactions per day. It is designed to provide speed, 
reliability, fault tolerance, and extra bandwidth, storage and processing 
capacity to accommodate annual growth rates of 50%. 
3. ORDER MANAGEMENT SYSTEM 
AlphaCo’s order management system provides service to manufacturers and 
resellers via the internet. It acts as a channel middle man between 
manufacturers and resellers. The company’s business dependency on the 
World Wide Web requires maintaining assurance around the integrity of 
transactions. To address the security threats posed by e-commerce, AlphaCo 
uses Secured Socket Layer (SSL), which provides 128-bit encryption of 
packets to and from its e-commerce clients. Furthermore, all manufacturers and 
resellers are required to authenticate themselves as legitimate business partners. 
This process is very rigorous, as authenticated resellers can receive discounted 
products and create lines of credit. After a reseller is approved and given an 
online account, proof of sales of $5000 or more is expected within 60 days, or 
a probationary period begins. The probationary period escalates to termination 
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of an account if proof of sales is not shown within 120 days. Once resellers log 
on to AlphaCo’s order management system they are able to purchase products 
for reselling. When an order is made, a shipping order is placed in the shipping 
database. At AlphaCo’s warehouse, a distribution associate ships out the order 
and creates an invoice in the billing database. A billing agent processes the 
invoice to determine whether it should be mailed to the client or withdrawn 
directly from the client’s bank account. A mailed invoice is entered into the 
collections database. When an invoice is not paid within 90 days it is written 
off as a bad debt. An unpaid invoice under $1500 places the user account on a 
probationary period while an uncollected invoice exceeding $1500 results in 
the termination of the user account. The second occurrence of non-payment 
results in the termination of the user account (see Appendices 2 and 3). 
4. ALPHACO RESPONSE 
The CIO was disappointed with the fact that AlphaCo had been hacked. But he 
was particularly concerned with the fact that it took the firm three months to 
detect the hacking incident. While the CEO and CFO were considering the 
CIO’s request for additional IT budget, the CIO had to respond to the potential 
IT security vulnerabilities immediately within the constraints of his current 
budget. 
Working with what they already know, the IT department, computer forensics 
experts, and IT security consultants constructed a preliminary scenario about 
how the hacking might have happened. They reasoned that the hacker initially 
penetrated AlphaCo’s online system by exploiting an unpatched service 
running on an exposed web server. The exploit gave the hacker root access, 
which was used to view connection strings to the order management system’s 
database. The database resided within AlphaCo’s internal network. Using the 
database connection strings and spoofing web server identity, the hacker was 
able to connect to the database and execute SQL statements. At that point the 
hacker had the ability to create fake accounts from which to place the 
fraudulent orders. The network penetration did not stop there. Through the 
database, extended stored procedures were used to discover yet another 
unpatched service and install password sniffers4, which were used to create 
unauthorized Virtual private network (VPN) connections. A reverse tunnel was 
created using the exploited service, thus connecting the database server to the 
hacker’s local workstation. The database server was then used as a proxy to 
discover other critical servers on the network and the services they owned. 
Despite the plausibility of the preliminary scenario, both the consultants and 
the IT department acknowledged that there could be alternative scenarios 
explaining the hacking incident. A costly computer forensics investigation of 
                                                 
4 “Password sniffers” are applications used to discover passwords by scanning cached data, 
capturing key strokes, or decrypting encrypted data. 
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the available electronic evidence was necessary to discover how exactly the 
hacking incident happened. But nobody was sure if the evidence remained 
intact since the hacking incident. 
Patch management was the first item identified as lacking. All critical servers 
needed to be up to date with critical patches within 72 hours of patch release. 
The next item was creating a policy that required all database connection 
strings to be encrypted. In reaction to the potential for installation of password 
sniffers, virus scanning software was upgraded on all critical servers and 
configured to receive automatic updates of new malicious software to scan for. 
Also, all software on critical servers needed to have a business justification for 
being installed.  
Several monitoring controls were put in place to detect fraud. All new 
customer accounts were to be reconciled each month for appropriate credit 
check approval. Also, security logs and virus scanning logs were to be 
reviewed each week for possible network intrusions. Other areas identified as 
lacking controls were firewalls and account administration. Firewall 
configurations needed to be appropriate and open ports needed to be justified. 
Also, generic accounts and administrative accounts without business 
justification needed to be removed from critical servers. This would not only 
benefit account administration, but also increase the transparency of the 
security logs. 
Despite these measures, the CIO was wondering what else they need to do to 
prevent hacking attempts, and to detect an incident sooner if hackers manage to 
compromise their systems again in the future. The IT security consultants who 
reviewed the initial response of AlphaCo praised the IT department in 
addressing technical vulnerabilities. But they also recommended the 
development of a more comprehensive policy that addresses all relevant 
dimensions of IT security. 
5. AUDITOR RESPONSE 
After the internal investigation, AlphaCo informed its external auditor about 
the hacking incident. The external auditors called for several meetings with the 
management to discuss the case. After the meetings, the audit senior managers 
and partners engaged in a discussion to determine whether and how this 
hacking incident would affect the financial statement audit. They documented 
their thought process and rationale in a question and answer format as follows: 
1. What is the control activity that failed in this incident? 
The network security controls for the online ordering system appeared 
to have been lacking, as demonstrated by the successful intrusion by a 
malicious hacker. 
2. Is this an indication of pervasive control weakness?  
No. We have tested other General Computer Controls, including 
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Information Security controls at the Network, Operating System, 
Database, and Application layers. Our test of controls did not indicate 
any significant issue with the Information Security control 
environment. 
3. What is the likelihood that similar incident would occur in the future? 
It would be difficult to answer this question with certainty, but 
according to the professional judgment of our IT Security Specialists, 
the technique employed by the hacker is relatively high in 
sophistication and rigor. In other words, it is not something that can 
easily be re-performed.  
4. What are the actual AND maximum potential loss and/or misstatement 
resulting from the control failure? 
The actual loss from this known event alone was $20 million. Based on 
professional judgment, we estimate that there could be no more than 10 
other incidents occurring throughout the fiscal year, either detected or 
not. As such the total potential misstatement for the entire fiscal year is 
$200 million overstatement of Accounts Receivable and Revenue 
balances. 
5. Is there any redundant or compensating control that could prevent or 
detect potential future violations? 
This incident was discovered by the company due to their Accounts 
Receivable Aging Review process. The Accounting department 
reviews all A/R balances that have been outstanding for a certain 
period of time. For example, any balance older than 90 days are 
flagged and researched by the Credits and Collections department, who 
may contact the customer if no satisfactory explanation is available. 
After 120 days, the balance will be transferred to “Uncollectible 
Balances”. It was through this process that they were able to discover 
an anomaly with the customer accounts used by the hacker to purport 
this fraud. By the time the process caught up, the damage was $20 
million. By further analysis, we can reasonably say that the 
compensating control exists to catch any error in the amount of $5 
million or more, over a 90 days period. This translates to $20 million 
per year. 
6. What other qualitative factors can be considered in our analysis? 
The fact that the company was able to catch the misstatement within a 
reasonable time-frame and prior to the Auditor is indicative of 
effective detective and corrective control compensating for weakness 
in preventive control. Since the discovery of the issue, the company 
had taken steps to improve the information security control 
environment. 
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7. Given all of these considerations, how should we consider the issue 
and its impact on our audit? 
Although the company’s internal controls could not prevent all fraud, 
they appear adequate for detecting and correcting one. Apart from 
making the proper adjustment to reflect the uncollectible balance 
resulted from this incident, we do not think any further adjustments are 
necessary. However, we should perform follow up procedure to ensure 
that the new security measures the company had committed to have 
been implemented. Furthermore, we should increase the rigor and 
sample size of our substantive testing on the account balances that 
could be affected by this incident, namely Accounts Receivable and 
Revenue from sales. We should also conduct a follow up compliance 
testing on the compensating controls that were relied upon by the 
company to detect potential future misstatements from similar 
incidents (i.e., A/R Aging, Bank Reconciliation, etc.). 
6. OUTCOMES 
The audited financial report of AlphaCo in 2002 did not make any reference to 
the hacking incident, the resulting fraudulent activity, or the loss of 
approximately $20 million. 
The hacking incident was not disclosed until after the hacker was caught and 
indicted. When the news of the hacking incident emerged on March 3, 2005 
through the jury’s indictment, the stock market reacted to the news by 
adjusting AlphaCo’s stock price as shown in Appendix 4. 
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APPENDIX 1: FINANCIAL STATEMENTS 
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APPENDIX 2: CUSTOMER CREDIT APPROVAL PROCESS 
 
Note: This process diagram is created for discussion purposes building on 
Gelinas, Sutton, and Fedorowicz (2004). 
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APPENDIX 3: SELLING AND SHIPPING PROCESS 
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APPENDIX 4: STOCK PRICE OF ALPHACO AROUND THE 
ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE HACKING INCIDENT 
Date Open High Low Close Volume Adj Close*
1-Mar-05 $28.57 $29.42 $28.44 $28.50 2946200 $28.50
2-Mar-05 $28.50 $29.18 $28.40 $28.66 2855234 $28.66
3-Mar-05 $28.66 $21.90 $21.48 $21.48 3041523 $21.48
4-Mar-05 $21.48 $21.96 $21.00 $21.30 2845294 $21.30
5-Mar-05 $21.30 $21.27 $20.25 $21.25 2975235 $21.25
* Close price adjusted for dividends and splits.
Stock price of AlphaCo
$20.00
$22.00
$24.00
$26.00
$28.00
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ALPHACO: A TEACHING CASE ON 
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AUDIT AND 
SECURITY 
TEACHING NOTE 
This teaching note is developed as a companion teaching aid for “ALPHACO: 
A TEACHING CASE ON INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AUDIT AND 
SECURITY.” The AlphaCo case is designed to foster classroom discussions 
around IT audit and system security issues, especially in the context of firms 
that are subject to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. The case is most suitable 
for IT Audit and security courses aiming to teach IT risks, IT controls, and IT 
audit practices; MIS courses aiming to teach general computer controls and 
application controls; and accounting courses aiming to teach internal controls 
and frameworks such as COSO and COBIT. 
DISCUSSION POINTS AND GUIDELINES 
1. The impact of IT security breaches on firm value 
The case can be used to illustrate the impact of IT security breaches on firms. 
AlphaCo lost about $20 million due to the fraudulent orders placed by the 
hacker. While this amount may appear small for the $42 billion firm, 
instructors should draw student’s attention to the stock price reactions to the 
news of the hacking incident. Appendix 4 shows that the stock of AlphaCo lost 
about 25% of its value within 48 hours of the announcement of the hacking 
incident. This is a major loss in market capitalization of the firm. Instructors 
can also discuss damage to the reputation of the firm. 
Suggested discussion questions: 
? What harm does this hacking incident do to the firm? 
? Should the firm disclose the hacking incident to the public? Why? 
2. Implications for regulatory compliance 
The case can be used to foster a discussion about the importance of IT controls 
over financial reporting and SOX compliance efforts of firms. With increasing 
dependence of corporations on information technology, the effectiveness of IT 
control has an impact on financial reporting as well as the auditor’s audit 
strategy. The COSO framework serves as a plausible tool in evaluating internal 
controls (See Teaching Note Appendix 1). The COBIT framework integrates 
internal control with information and information technology (See Teaching 
Note Appendix 2). These frameworks provide conceptual guidance in 
designing, implementing, and evaluating internal controls. However, not all 
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components of these frameworks are related to financial reporting. Auditors 
take selected controls into account when assessing the effectiveness of IT 
control over financial reporting. 
Section 404 of SOX requires the CEO and CFO to annually state their 
responsibility for establishing and maintaining an adequate internal control 
structure and procedures for financial reporting, conduct and provide an 
assessment of the effectiveness of the enterprise’s internal controls. It also 
requires the external auditor to attest to the management’s assertion and the 
internal controls identified by the management. Thus, the hacking incident that 
led to fraudulent orders could have an impact on the firm’s financial statement 
audit. 
Section 302 of SOX requires the CEO and CFO of a public company to certify 
quarterly and annually that they are responsible for disclosure controls, they 
have designed controls to ensure that material information is known to them, 
evaluated the effectiveness of controls, presented their conclusions in the 
filing, and disclosed to the audit committee and auditors significant control 
deficiencies and acts of fraud. Since the firm’s IT systems are critical to 
initiate, record, process, summarize and report accurate financial and non-
financial data, the hacking incident could indicate deficiencies in IT controls of 
the firm and adversely affect the firm’s ability to comply with SOX. The figure 
in Teaching Note Appendix 3 can be used to discuss why IT is important in the 
design, implementation, and sustainability of internal control over disclosure 
and financial reporting. 
Suggested discussion questions: 
? How and why are IT controls relevant to financial reporting? 
? How does the hacking incident influence financial statement audit of the 
firm? 
? How does the hacking incident influence firm’s ability to comply with 
SOX? 
3. Usage of the COSO and COBIT frameworks 
The case intentionally leaves out details about how exactly the hacking 
incident happened at AlphaCo. The purpose is to foster in-class discussions 
around internal control weaknesses (IT and non-IT) that could potentially lead 
to such IT security breaches. Instructors can cover the COSO and COBIT 
frameworks in advance of this discussion as conceptual tools in thinking about 
internal controls (See Teaching Note Appendix 1 and Teaching Note Appendix 
2). The discussion can be used to teach students the logic of the COSO and 
COBIT frameworks and how they can be used in designing and testing 
effective business and IT controls. 
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Suggested discussion questions:  
? Which internal control weaknesses allowed the hacker to break into IT 
systems of AlphaCo?  
? Which internal control weaknesses should the management try to fix 
immediately? Why? 
4. Differences among preventive, detective, compensating or steering 
controls 
Instructors can use this hacking case as a context for introducing and 
discussing different types of controls such as preventive, detective, 
compensating or steering controls. Preventive controls are designed to prevent 
errors or irregularities such as the hacking incident in this case. Detective 
controls are for detecting errors or irregularities after they occur. If resource 
limitations preclude the implementation of more direct controls, compensating 
controls provide reasonable assurance. Steering controls can be designed to 
guide actions towards desired objectives. 
Suggested discussion questions: 
? What types of internal controls allowed the firm to detect the fraud? 
? What types of internal controls can the firm design to detect fraud much 
earlier in the future? 
? What types of internal controls can be designed to prevent future 
occurrences of hacking? 
5. External auditor’s and management’s responsibility for detecting and 
reporting fraud 
The case can be used to foster discussions about external auditor’s and 
management’s responsibilities for detecting and reporting fraud. The case 
states that the audited financial report of AlphaCo in 2002 did not make any 
reference to the hacking incident, the resulting fraudulent activity, or the loss 
of approximately $20 million. It could be because the fraud was not classified 
as a significant deficiency or material weakness. The magnitude of the fraud 
($20 million) was probably well below the materiality level for the $42 billion 
firm; it was detected by AlphaCo’s internal control systems; compensating 
controls were immediately in place; and the likelihood of reoccurrence was 
remote. 
Suggested discussion questions: 
? What are managers’ responsibilities for detecting and reporting fraud? 
? What are external auditors’ responsibilities for detecting and reporting 
fraud? 
? Why did the audited financial report of AlphaCo in 2002 not make any 
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reference to the hacking incident, the resulting fraudulent activity, or the 
loss of approximately $20 million? 
? What criteria do auditors use to classify a control exception into 
Deficiency, Significant Deficiency, and Material Weakness categories? 
? Under what conditions does an IT control exception become classified 
as a Deficiency, Significant Deficiency, or Material Weakness? 
SAS (Statements on Auditing Standards) No.1 states: "The auditor has a 
responsibility to plan and perform the audit to obtain reasonable assurance 
about whether the financial statements are free of material misstatement, 
whether caused by error or fraud. Because of the nature of audit evidence and 
the characteristics of fraud, the auditor is able to obtain reasonable, but not 
absolute, assurance that material misstatements are detected. The auditor has 
no responsibility to plan and perform the audit to obtain reasonable assurance 
that misstatements, whether caused by error or fraud, that are not material to 
the financial statements are detected." 
SAS No. 99 describes a process in which the auditor (1) gathers information 
needed to identify risks of material misstatement due to fraud; (2) assesses 
these risks after taking into account an evaluation of the entity’s programs and 
controls; and (3) responds to the results. Auditors should comply with AICPA 
(American Institute of Certified Public Accountants) professional standard to 
help clients prevent fraud. The risk of fraud can be reduced through a 
combination of prevention, deterrence, and detection measures. 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act created new responsibilities for both the accounting 
profession and corporations. The main responsibility of detecting fraud still 
falls on management. Management is now required to assess the company’s 
system of internal control prior to the audit. Then, the auditors attest to the 
accuracy of the management’s assertions on internal control. The auditor is 
required to thoroughly document testing done in attesting to management’s 
assertions on the effectiveness of their internal control system. To form an 
opinion as to whether control systems provide managers with reasonable 
assurance that desired business outcomes will be achieved, the auditor has to 
consider the issue of materiality. Instructors can refer to AICPA (2006) in our 
reference list for specific guidance on evaluating control exceptions and 
deficiencies.  
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TEACHING NOTE APPENDIX 1: COSO ERM FRAMEWORK AND 
COMPONENTS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sources: Enterprise Risk Management—Integrated Framework: Executive 
Summary and Framework, Exhibit 1.1, p. 23; and Enterprise Risk 
Management—Integrated Framework: Application Techniques, Exhibit 1.1, p. 
2. Copyright © 2004 by the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the 
Treadway Commission. Reproduced with permission from the AICPA acting 
as authorized copyright administrator for COSO.  
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TEACHING NOTE APPENDIX 2: COBIT FRAMEWORK 
 
Source: COBIT 4.0, used by permission of the IT Governance Institute (ITGI). 
1996, 1998, 2000, 2005 IT Governance Institute (ITGI). All rights reserved. 
COBIT is a registered trademark of ISACA and the IT Governance Institute. 
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TEACHING NOTE APPENDIX 3: IT CONTROLS 
 
Source: IT Control Objectives for Sarbanes-Oxley, used by permission of the 
IT Governance Institute (ITGI). ©2004 IT Governance Institute (ITGI). All 
rights reserved. 
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